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HOW TAKINGS LEGISLATION COULD IMPROVE ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATION
E. DONALD ELLIOT*
The conventional wisdom is wrong: Takings law and environ-
mental regulation are not necessarily mortal adversaries. Clari-
fying and expanding the rights to compensation for property
owners could actually improve environmental regulation, not
"gut" it, as many commentators assume.1
Strengthening rights of financial compensation for owners of
property adversely affected by environmental regulation can im-
prove the quality of environmental regulation by "regulating the
regulators"-essentially creating incentives for government to
design rules more carefully and maximize the environmental
benefits of regulatory investments.2
The second thesis is even more striking and counterintuitive:
Stronger protection for property rights also may result in stron-
ger environmental laws and regulations. By spreading the costs
of environmental regulation over a larger segment of the popula-
tion, takings legislation not only could increase distributional
* Professor of Law (Adj.), Yale Law School, and. Partner, Paul, Hastings,
Janofsky & Walker, Washington, D.C. Former Assistant Administrator and General
Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1989-1991, and Julien and Virginia
Cornell Professor of Environmental Law and Litigation, Yale Law School. B.A., 1970;
J.D., 1974, Yale University.
1. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90 (1995) ([T]he doctrine [of regulatory tak-
ings] protects economic interests in the development of land against otherwise valid
enactments of the democratic process, thereby inhibiting experimentation with new
environmental initiatives."). I do agree, however, with many of Professor Byrne's other
points, including his appreciation of the irony that conservatives, who normally argue
for judicial restraint, are rewriting the constitutional doctrine of takings law. See id.
at 118-19. In my view, these types of changes should come through legislation.
2. Elsewhere I have used the concept of regulatory "leverage" to describe the cor-
relation between the government's regulatory expenditures and the resources that
are redirected as a result. See E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad,
20 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 2 (1992).
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fairness but also may reduce political opposition to stronger en-
vironmental protection measures.3
The conclusion that greater attention and sensitivity to the
effects of environmental regulation on the rights of property
owners could improve environmental protection efforts is based
not only on theory4 and preliminary findings in the empirical
literature5 but also on my experience as General Counsel of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from
1989 to 1991.6 During that period, an Executive Order7 and the
rising political power of the property rights movement8 forced
the EPA to pay more attention to takings considerations. Great-
er sensitivity to avoiding regulatory takings of private property,
however, did not prevent us from pursuing any regulatory tar-
gets; rather, greater sensitivity to the effect that our regulations
might have on property owners probably improved those regu-
lations, both from an environmental standpoint and in terms of
minimizing unnecessary burdens on property owners.
Of course, much depends on how particular takings legislation
is drafted; I would not support everything in the bills introduced
in the 105th Congress.9 Conceptually, however, legislation
would be useful: (1) to require agencies to assess the conse-
quences of their proposed regulatory actions on private property,
(2) to clarify the "trigger" for what constitutes a compensable
regulatory burden, and (3) to provide at least partial compensa-
tion for property owners burdened disproportionately by govern-
ment regulation, even if the government action falls short of a
constitutional taking.1"
3. See David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race To Develop, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 655, 697 (1995).
4. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
7. See Exec. Order No. 12,630,3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
8. See George E. Grimes, Jr., Comment, Texas Private Real Property Rights Pres-
ervation Act: A Political Solution to the Regulatory Takings Problem, 27 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 557, 580-85 (1996) (describing the rise of the property rights movement).
9. See S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995).
10. David Sive, known as the "father of environmental law," see Margaret Cronin
Fisk, Leading Lawyers Who Practice Power, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at C2, is also an
advocate of legislation to provide some compensation to property owners whose inter-
ests may be damaged by environmental regulatory programs. See David Sive, High
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The central issue in takings law is distributive justice: To
what extent should society impose disproportionate burdens on
particular members?" The resolution of this issue depends fun-
damentally on the level of burden that society expects others to
bear, but that inquiry is a matter of legislative rather than adju-
dicative fact; 2 a central reason that the "takings muddle" 3
has proved so intractable in regulatory takings cases is that
such questions of comprehensive social accounting cannot be an-
swered well in the context of a single adjudication. 4 It is im-
possible, for example, for a court to determine as a matter of
adjudicative fact whether the burden imposed by prohibiting
farming in order to preserve a wetland is disproportionate to
that imposed by drafting an eighteen year old into the army.
The only immediate way out of the "takings muddle" is for the
legislature to establish a compensation "trigger" that defines, at
least implicitly, the level of burden that society expects its mem-
bers to bear without being compensated. 5 Although legislation
obviously would not bind the courts in constitutional adjudica-
Court is at a Crossroads on Takings, NATL L.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 20 ("Should not
property owners who suffer substantial losses of the value of their properties in some
cases receive some compensation, whether or not the regulation constitutes a taking?").
11. See Leigh Raymond, Comment, The Ethics of Compensation: Takings, Utility,
and Justice, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 577, 578 (1996).
12. For an explanation of the general distinction between legislative and adjudica-
tive facts, see FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
13. See Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle,
28 IND. L. REV. 329 (1995).
14. For a discussion of the complexity of accounting for the benefits and burdens
of government actions on individuals, see generally Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-18 (1967) (examining compensation and utility).
Although a comprehensive accounting is impossible, it may be feasible to detect clear
instances of disproportionality that "stick[ ] out like a sore thumb." Cf E. Donald
Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems,
73 GEo. L.J. 1357, 1369-72 (1985) (discussing the infeasibility of profiling all risks to
which individuals are exposed but arguing that it is possible to identify large risk
disparities).
15. That is what was so useful about the proposed "triggers" built into the legis-
lation proposed in the 104th Congress. See S. 605, 104th Cong. §§ 204, 508 (1995);
H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). Perhaps the proposed diminution of value triggers
in the legislation were too crude or the levels inappropriate, but rather than criticiz-
ing the enterprise, environmentalists should join in perfecting acceptable tests for
disproportionate burdens on property through the legislative process.
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tion, legislative findings as to what level of social burden is ex-
pected to be borne without compensation would be relevant to
the constitutional inquiry, particularly if the legislative determi-
nation were grounded in empirical evidence of the burdens as-
sumed routinely by other members of the community without
compensation.
Environmentalists should put aside their unjustified fears
that environmental regulation cannot survive unless the govern-
ment takes property without compensation. 6 Instead, we
should welcome legislation that clarifies the extent to which
society can regulate the obligations of property ownership with-
out providing compensation. Garrett Hardin's watershed article
The Tragedy of the Commons still offers sage advice: Private
property is not the enemy but, rather, is part of the solution to
environmental problems. 7
I.
Takings law is a regulatory system. The constitutional princi-
ple that the government must compensate owners if it "takes"
private property through regulation that "goes too far"'8 is not
only a matter of distributional fairness but also a way to regu-
late government regulators. If government must pay for the
16. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 1, at 91 (describing the regulatory takings doctrine
as "frustrating democratic attempts to protect the environment"); Robert L. Glicksman
& Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the Contract with America:
Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental Protection?, KAN. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y, Winter 1996, at 9, 22 (suggesting that the prospect of less environmental
regulation may be the driving force behind property rights legislation).
17. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968);
see generally CONRAD TOTMAN, THE GREEN ARCHIPELAGO 83-169 (1989) (studying the
historical role that creation of property rights played in avoiding environmental di-
saster in pre-industrial Japan).
18. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
19. For a general discussion of other mechanisms for regulating regulation, such
as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulatory review process, see Sym-
posium, Regulating Regulation: The Political Economy of Administrative Procedures
and Regulatory Instruments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1994, at 1.
For purposes of this Article, the OMB regulatory review process under Execu-
tive Orders 12,291 and 12,866 can be viewed as a "specific deterrence" approach to-
ward regulating government regulation. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638
(1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127
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cost of property made valueless by regulation, it has an incen-
tive to regulate more efficiently by looking for regulatory invest-
ments that create benefits greater than the costs they incur."
Takings law regulates government regulation at a metalevel
through the general style of regulation that Calabresi has called
"general deterrence": Government is not prohibited from taking
any particular regulatory action but is subject to an incentive to
consider carefully the costs and benefits of measures that may
"go too far" in regulating private property because of the threat
of paying compensation.2 Although most judgments come out
of a government-wide "judgment fund,"22 proposed takings leg-
islation would require payment of takings judgments from the
budget of the agency proposing the regulation in order to en-
courage efficient regulation.
Like other forms of regulation, takings law does not necessari-
ly harm the activity being regulated.' The effect of regulation
on the underlying activity depends upon the nature of the incen-
tives generated by the regulatory structure and on how well the
regulation is designed and administered.' In some instances,
regulation actually may improve the underlying activity by con-
(1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601. That approach is complemented by the "general
deterrence" approach provided by takings law as outlined in this Article.
For my own views on the strengths and weaknesses of the OMB regulatory re-
view effort, see E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under
Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About
It, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 167.
20. In essence, takings law asks the prospective' regulator the Rawlsian "veil of
ignorance" question: Would you have done it even if you had to pay for it? See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
21. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCmENTS 68-69 (1970) ("[Gen-
eral deterrence] involves giving people freedom to choose whether they would rather
engage in the activity and pay the costs of doing so . . . or, given the accident
costs, engage in safer activities that might otherwise have seemed less desirable.").
22. Payson R. Peabody, Will the 104th Congress Revolutionize Fifth Amendment
Takings Law?: An Analysis of the Private Property Protection Act of 1995, 5 FED.
CiR. B.J. 199, 205 (1995).
23. But see Robert Meltz, Federal Regulation of the Environment and the Taking
Issue, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 95, 96 (1990) ("[I]t takes but a handful of decisions
against the government to undercut program effectiveness.").
24. See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation:
Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 253 (1991) ("[Ihe extent to which
net benefits accrue will depend on how the government actually implements pro-
grams designed to address specific social problems ....").
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tributing more to improving the activity's efficiency than the
regulation itself costs.'
The idea that, in theory, regulation may improve the activity
being regulated is well understood for forms of government regu-
lation other than takings law.26 For example, Professors Porter
and van der Linde have argued that environmental regulation
may encourage enterprises to become more efficient in their use
of raw materials.
An analogous point can be made with regard to takings law
that regulates government regulators: Takings law may result in
improvements in government regulation by giving government
an incentive to weigh the costs as well as the benefits of pro-
posed regulations." Put into the language of economics and
public choice theory, the point is a simple one: Any activity that
is costless to the user-whether using the air as a global waste
dump or confiscating other people's property as a wetlands pre-
serve-will tend to be overconsumed because the user will be
able to appropriate a portion of the benefits from the activity
while externalizing most of the costs.29 This principle underlies
25. See id. at 254 ("Although the benefits of social regulation may equal or exceed
its costs, the potential exists for far greater efficiency improvements since it is un-
likely that marginal benefits equal marginal costs.").
26. See id. ("[Aireas for potential efficiency gains include drug, pesticide, and occu-
pational safety regulation.").
27.
Properly designed environmental standards can trigger innovations that
lower the total cost of a product or improve its value. Such innovations
allow companies to use a range of inputs more productively-from raw
materials to energy to labor-thus offsetting the costs of improving envi-
ronmental impact ... . Ultimately, this enhanced resource productivity
makes companies more competitive, not less.
Michael E. Porter & Clas van der Linde, Green and Competitive: Ending the Stale-
mate, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 120.
28. See Jerry Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595,
611 (1995) ("By forcing the government to pay when it takes, the clause forces gov-
ernment to weigh the costs of regulation against the benefits."); John P. Lodise,
Note, Retroactive Compensation and the Illusion of Economic Efficiency: An Analysis
of the First English Decision, 35 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1272-73 (1988) ("First English
forces the government to consider whether a land-use regulation is more valuable
than the cost it creates.").
29. See Hardin, supra note 17, at 1244; Christopher D. Stone, What To Do About
Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 577, 581 (1995).
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the modern economic theory of environmental pollution (as well
as tort law); regulation ultimately attempts to counteract
overconsumption by internalizing externalities where the market
fails to do so because of transaction costs. 30
Many environmentalists, however, have been slow to recognize
that the same economic argument applies, at a metalevel, to the
regulation of government regulation itself. For instance, if gov-
ernment regulators can appropriate the political credit for their
regulatory actions 3' but are able to externalize most of the costs
as uncompensated losses to property owners, they will have in-
centives to overconsume regulation in the same way that pol-
luters have an incentive to overconsume the air or the water.32
The empirical literature on uncompensated governmental tak-
ings has begun to confirm the point predicted by economic theo-
ry. For example, an army that obtains "free" labor through the
draft tends to oversubstitute human capital for technology; an
army that pays market rates for human labor is a different ar-
my, but it is not necessarily an inferior one-it may even be
cheaper and more efficient."3 This counterintuitive point is the
same one made by Professors Porter and van der Linde about
environmental regulation: The discipline engendered by having
to pay market rates for inputs, rather than obtaining some of
tlhem as "subsidies" (because the legal system protects them in-
adequately), can improve government regulation.
The discipline engendered by paying market rates for inputs
can improve the quality, as well as affect the quantity, of gov-
30. See, e.g., David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 619, 651-52 (1994) ("Because the regulated market internalizes costs
that would be externalities in an unregulated market, the regulated market more
closely approximates a perfect market.").
31. On political credit-claiming as an incentive for regulatory development, see
generally E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Fed-
eralization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-35 (1985).
32. See Adam Babich, Understanding the New Era in Environmental Law, 41 S.C.
L. REv. 733, 749-62 (1990) (utilizing economics to explain environmental law); Hahn
& Hird, supra note 24, at 235 ("Current fiscal pressures . . . are likely to encourage
Congress and the President increasingly to use social regulations as a tool for
achieving political objectives.").
33. See generally William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation:
Lessons from the Military Draft for the Takings Issue 5-7 (Mar. 7, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the American Enterprise Institute).
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ernment regulation. This distinction is important because the
consensus is that our problem is not one of too much regulation
but rather improving the quality of regulation by making sure
that regulatory investments produce benefits commensurate
with their costs. 4 For example, the United States continues to
lose approximately 70,000 acres of wetlands per year." Appro-
priately designed incentives"6 would not necessarily cut back on
the total acreage of wetlands being preserved by government
regulation. Rather, appropriate incentives can help influence
government regulation to focus more effectively on preserving
those wetlands that produce the greatest benefits in terms of
wetlands values (where the government would be presumably
most willing to pay compensation, if necessary). Moreover, as
discussed below, 7 it is wrong to assume that government has
to pay for property that is "taken."
To be sure, thinking about takings law as a system for regu-
lating government regulation is not the whole story behind tak-
ings law (as the other contributions to this Symposium make
clear). Nor is it true to say that everything that has been pro-
posed to date in so-called takings legislation is defensible or
would not gut government regulation.38
Mine is a narrower, but nonetheless important point, which is
borne out in the literature and in my own experience in govern-
ment: greater protection for the legitimate expectations of proper-
ty owners does not necessarily have to gut regulation, including
environmental regulation.39 On the contrary, just as environ-
mental protection and economic growth can be compatible and
mutually reinforcing, rather than locked in a "zero sum
game," so too can protection of private property be compatible
with environmental protection or other forms of government
regulation.
34. See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 2, at 5-11.
35. See, e.g., A Victory for Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, at E12.
36. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.




I approach the takings issue largely from the perspective of an
ex-regulator and a life-long environmentalist. I served as Gener-
al Counsel of the EPA from 1989 to 1991. In that capacity, I had
the distinct personal privilege of being regulated by one of the
other participants in this conference, Jim Brookshire of the De-
partment of Justice, as we attempted to implement the 1988
Executive Order on Takings.4
At the risk of being accused of falling prey to the Stockholm
Syndrome (in which hostages begin to identify with their cap-
tors),42 I want to argue generally in favor of takings legislation.
As an ex-regulator and a continuing proponent of sensible gov-
ernment regulation to protect the environment, I maintain that
further development of regulatory takings law-and particularly
legislative clarification of the level of impact that is compensa-
ble-is not a bad thing. Further progress in takings law could
improve environmental regulation if done properly.
One of the ironies of modern administrative law is that many
of the techniques of environmental regulation developed in the
1970s and 1980s now are being used at a metalevel in an at-
tempt to regulate government regulators. 43 Not surprisingly, we
now hear the same kinds of complaints by government regula-
tors who face imminent regulation that we used to hear from
industry: "This is unnecessary"; "We are already doing it on our
41. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994). Section 3(a) of the Executive Order states that "[g]overnmental officials
should be sensitive to, anticipate, and account for, the obligations imposed by the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment in planning and carrying out
governmental actions so that they do not result in the imposition of unanticipated or
undue additional burdens on the public fisc." 3 C.F.R. at 556. Section 4 establishes
specific criteria with which executive departments and agencies must comply when
implementing policies that have takings implications. See 3 C.F.R. at 557. For exam-
ple, section 4(b) states that, "[wihen a proposed action would place a restriction on a
use of private property, the restriction imposed on the use shall not be dispropor-
tionate to the extent to which the use contributes to the overall problem that the
restriction is imposed to redress." Id.
42. See generally David Gelman, Still Psychic Captives, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1991,
at 27 (addressing the effects of the Stockholm Syndrome).
43. Cf Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 37-42 (tracing the history of regulatory
review).
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own"; or "The administrative and process costs would be too
great."" The outraged squeals of those who are about to be reg-
ulated should be discounted as much when they come from the
government as when they come from the private sector.
Many of the same techniques borrowed from environmental
regulation can be adapted quite usefully to the problem of regu-
lating government regulators. For example, the concept of tak-
ings assessments45 is modeled on the environmental impact
statements required by the National Environmental Policy
Act.4" In some instances, requiring a bureaucracy to develop
information about effects that it ordinarily would not consider
results in better regulations. Requirements to develop and make
available information (1) reduce the risk of "accidental takings"
in which the government inadvertently and unnecessarily takes
property through a regulatory measure just because no one
focused on the issue when designing the regulatory approach;47
and (2) enhance the ability of the politically responsible levels of
government to balance regulatory priorities against other social
goals.4" In short, the mandatory production of information use-
fully solves agent/principal problems by reducing monitoring
costs.49 Thus, I generally favor takings assessment legislation
similar to that already enacted by fourteen states ° and re-
44. Cf id. at 38-39 (recognizing environmentalists and the EPA as those most out-
raged by regulatory review).
45. See S. 605, 104th Cong. § 403(a)(1)(B) (1995) (directing federal agencies to
complete a "private property taking impact analysis before issuing or promulgating
any policy, regulation, proposed legislation, or related agency action which is likely
to result in a taking of private property").
46. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)
(1994) (requiring federal agencies to prepare "a detailed statement . . . on . . . the
environmental impact of the proposed action" for "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment").
47. Cf. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 764 n.202 (1993) (explaining how accidental takings occur).
48. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Re-
form, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 78 (1994) ("Agencies have more, and better, information
than Congress and the President about the content and consequences (political and
otherwise) of their regulatory policies. Legislative decisions concerning administrative
structure, then, will be grounded in an effort to correct this information imbalance.").
49. See id.
50. Those states are Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri,
Montana, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Cf.
1186
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quired at the federal level by Executive Order.5'
III.
Although I generally support the concept of takings compensa-
tion legislation, many serious problems existed in specific provi-
sions of the bills proposed in the 105th Congress.52 To assist in
improving future takings compensation legislation, I want to
share one of my experiences as General Counsel of the EPA and
suggest some lessons that can be learned from it in order to fa-
cilitate better legislation in the takings area.
David A. Thomas, The illusory Restraints and Empty Promises of New Property Pro-
tection Laws, 28 URB. LAW. 223, 224-32 (1996) (analyzing and criticizing new state
property protection laws).
51. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
52. See S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 9, 104th Cong. (1995). The House proper-
ty rights bill was passed originally as H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995).
One of the biggest problems with the proposed legislation was its lack of sym-
metry. The proposed legislation gave relatively clear triggers for what percentage
diminution in value constitutes a presumptive taking, but it put the burden on the
government to prove essentially a nuisance. See S. 605, § 204(d)(1) ("No compensa-
tion shall be required by this Act if the owner's use or proposed use of the property
is a nuisance as commonly understood and defined by background principles of nui-
sance and property law, as understood within the State in which the property is
situated . . . ."). The vagueness of the standards of nuisance law can increase the
"demoralization costs" for government. Cf Michelman, supra note 14, at 1214. Ac-
cording to Professor Michelman, if property owners are not compensated, then they
and society as a whole incur demoralization costs, which are defined as:
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which ac-
crue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization
that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar
value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or
social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their
sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they
themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.
Id. Although Professor Michelman referred to the demoralization of property owners,
the concept can be applied equally well to government actors. With these hidden
demoralization costs, the proposed takings legislation is not much of an improvement
over current takings law.
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A.
When the new, more aggressive takings case law began to
emerge in the late 1980s," EPA Administrator William Reilly
was concerned that a court might hold that the EPA had "taken"
private property through wetland protection. We regarded this as
a potential political disaster for the wetlands program, which
already was quite controversial. We did not need any more
"poster child" cases appearing on the pages of The New York
Times54  or The Wall Street Journal55  about the (alleged)
jackboot of government coming down on some poor family farmer.
I bore the task of trying to ensure that we did not uninten-
tionally act in a way that might result in a taking in the
wetlands area. Rather than write a memo, we convened all of
the Agency's Regional Administrators (RAs) for a day-long semi-
nar on takings law. The RAs are the top political appointees in
each of the ten EPA geographic regions who actually make the
decisions in particular wetlands cases.
As a law professor who sometimes teaches property, constitu-
tional, and environmental law, I essentially conducted a day-
long seminar for the EPA decisionmakers on takings law. I
handed out to the RAs (some of whom were lawyers and some of
whom were not) a draft legal opinion in a hypothetical case to
demonstrate how easy it would be-on certain facts-to find a
taking in a wetlands case. The hypothetical involved a small
family farm. Declaring certain crucial portions of the farm a pro-
53. Several cases decided by the courts in the late 1980s suggest a growing dis-
trust of regulation of land. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 837 (1987) (holding that an "essential nexus" must exist between the condition
attached to a development permit and the original purpose for the restriction on the
property); Loveladies Harbor, Inc., v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990)
(finding that denial of a Clean Water Act wetlands fill permit diminished the eco-
nomic value of the property by more than 99% without a "countervailing substantial
legitimate state interest" and awarding plaintiff $2.6 million in compensation), affd,
28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
54. See William Robbins, For Farmers, Wetlands Mean a Legal Quagmire, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1990, at Al (discussing an Army Corps of Engineers proposal requir-
ing a farmer to cede 25% of his 225-acre farm to the federal government as a wild-
life easement "in 'mitigation" of damage to wetlands).
55. See Rogue Regulators, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1991, at A14 (criticizing "rogue
actions of the wetlands bureaucracy," such as classifying a 127-acre ancestral farm
as wetlands and prohibiting its sale).
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tected wetland would have made it impossible for the owners to
continue operating the farm, making the property essentially
worthless.
The reaction of the RAs was very interesting. After some dis-
cussion and initial resistance, they eventually concluded that
they did not need to act as the government had in the hypotheti-
cal in order to achieve the goals of the program; once the RAs
understood the problem, they realized that they could work
around the problem to avoid a taking." The episode succeeded
in the sense that over the next few years, the EPA did not do
anything that constituted a taking in the wetlands program. 7
Trying to convey to the RAs how to avoid government action
that might constitute a taking was a very difficult experience. In
part, the task was difficult because we. faced the "muddle"58 of
the developing Supreme Court case law on takings. In addition,
quite a different body of jurisprudence is developing in the Fed-
eral Circuit, which is, in many ways, even more aggressive than
that at the Supreme Court level.59 For a government agency
56. In reaching that conclusion, however, we relied in part on the doctrine that to
constitute a taking, property has to be rendered essentially valueless. See, e.g.,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that a
taking occurs when the owner of real property is "called upon to sacrifice all eco-
nomically beneficial uses in the name of the common good"); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a taking occurs when a regulation
"denies an owner economically viable use of his land"). Some versions of proposed
legislation would overturn that rule by focusing on particular portions or segments
of the property. See S. 605 § 204(a)(2)(D), 104th Cong. (1995) ("A property owner
shall receive just compensation if. . . [agency] action diminishes the fair market
value of the property or the affected portion of the property which is the subject of
the action by 33 percent or more . . . ") (emphasis added); H.R. 925 § 3(a), 104th
Cong. (1995) ("The Federal Government shall compensate an owner of property
whose use of any portion of that property has been limited by an agency action ...
that diminishes the fair market value of that portion by 20 percent or more ... 
(emphasis added).
57. But see Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (holding that a U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers' denial of a Clean Water Act permit constituted a taking
for which landowners were entitled to just compensation). Under current law, the
EPA and the Corps exercise separate roles. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994)
(stating that the Corps may issue or deny wetlands file permit), with 33 U.S.C. §
1344(c) (stating that the EPA may veto permits issued by Corps).
58. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984)
59. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
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planning an action, however, it is impossible to know in advance
whether a case will go to the Federal Circuit or to the Supreme
Court. Moreover, my experience iii the private sector counseling
clients in the takings area was that the case law did not provide
clear guidance that would allow landowners to plan their con-
duct accordingly.
I want to make two points in connection with my EPA experi-
ence. First, it is not true that an increased obligation to pay
compensation for government regulation will necessarily result
in less government regulation, or less stringent government reg-
ulation.0 Second, legislation clarifying the standards for what
constitutes a compensable event would increase the effectiveness
of regulation.61
Both of these points grow out of a common intellectual per-
spective: a dynamic, or game-theory approach to legal rules.62
This approach, unlike the static perspective of traditional law
and economics, takes into account the fact that legal actors
change their behavior to adapt to legal rules.' Thus, takings
law is part of a dynamic system in which legal actors change
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995). In Florida Rock, the court found that a govern-
ment wetlands regulation violated the Just Compensation Clause when it worked a
"partial taking" of property. See id. at 1570. That is, a regulation that deprived the
owner of a substantial part of the economic use of his property constituted a com-
pensable "partial taking," rather than noncompensable "mere diminution" in value.
See id. The court indicated that the line should be drawn where a regulation ceases
to produce a "reciprocity of advantage." See id. at 1570-71; see also Loveladies Har-
bor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (concluding that
land could be segmented for purposes of evaluating a takings claim and affirming
that the relevant parcel of property for takings analysis was only the parcel bur-
dened by the regulation, rather than the entire tract of land).
60. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text.
62. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994)
(outlining and applying game theory in the legal context). "The early applications of
economic reasoning to the law were made with an eye toward understanding how
legal rules affect behavior." Id. at 4; accord Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law,
42 STAN. L. REV. 1291 (1991).
63. See BAIRD, supra note 62, at 4; cf. E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Ad-
ministrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 125, 152 (applying game theory to the legislative veto and observing that "the




their behavior according to the incentives created."
B.
It seems intuitively obvious that if government has to pay
more for some of its regulatory actions, a marginal incentive will
be created to cut back on the amount and stringency of regula-
tion. This logic, however, only goes so far, and there are a num-
ber of factors cutting in the other direction that must also be
taken into account.
The first countervailing factor is the effect of the political
counterreaction. When government regulation affects a particu-
lar individual or small group adversely and makes that identifi-
able group bear a relatively large economic burden for the bene-
fit of society as a whole, a political backlash can occur that may
undermine support for the regulatory programs." I referred to
an example earlier in terms of adverse press coverage of sympa-
thetic wetlands takings cases.66 The long-term costs of the polit-
ical setback suffered by the regulatory program can be greater
than the short-term benefit achieved through stringent regula-
tion; thus, paradoxically, less can work out to be more. This was
the sense to which Bill Reilly and I responded in 1990 in the
wetlands area.
Recently, the phenomenon of political counterreaction has
been explored in more formal terms in an excellent paper by
Professor Barton Thompson of Stanford Law School.67 In his
working paper on the Endangered Species Act for the American
Enterprise Institute, Professor Thompson applied Nobel Prize
winner George Stigler's model of regulatory politics to analyze
the effect of takings compensation on the stringency of regula-
64. Cf. Elliott, supra note 63, at 152 (discussing strategic behavior).
65. See id.
66. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
67. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in
Takings and Incentives 61 (Mar. 7, 1996) (unpublished conference paper presented at
the American Enterprise Institute seminar entitled "Economic and Constitutional
Perspectives on Takings," on file with the American Enterprise Institute) ("By remov-
ing property owner opposition, a compensation requirement might well free Congress
and the [Fish and Wildlife Service] to pursue greater habitat preservation.").
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tion.6" Stigler's thesis is that if a burden falls on a well-orga-
nized, concentrated interest, such a group may be more effective
in securing political redress than a larger group would where
the burden is spread over a larger number of people.69 The im-
plication of the Stiglarian analysis for regulatory takings is that
there will be much less political backlash if the burden of pre-
serving wetlands, for example, is spread over a large group of
people instead of concentrated on a few. Of course, the effect of
compensation for takings is to spread the cost burden of regula-
tion over a large group (taxpayers) rather than a small group
(owners of the property taken). Paradoxically, imposing a small
cost on a large group may actually result in less effective politi-
cal opposition to regulation.
Some limited empirical evidence from Australia supports the
thesis that paying partial compensation may decrease opposition
to strong environmental protection measures.7" Australia adopt-
ed a partial compensation system for preserving habitat and
strengthened its protection of habitat at the same time.7 Al-
though the results are not conclusive, the limited empirical evi-
dence available belies the assumption that paying compensation
to those who are affected adversely leads automatically to less
stringent government regulation.72
The conclusion that paying compensation does not necessarily
impede the underlying activity's effectiveness is also confirmed
by experience in other areas. The volunteer army is a good ex-
ample.73 At the time that the all-volunteer army was originally
proposed, the country had long been subject to the draft, which
68. See id. at 58-62.
69. See id. at 58-59; see also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 114, 123 (1975) (advancing the theory that con-
centrated interest groups often are able to exert a disproportionate influence on the
political process).
70. See Thompson, supra note 67, at 61 (citing David Farrier, Conserving
Biodiversity on Private Land 5, 9 (Jan. 1995) (unpublished paper on file with the
University of Colorado National Resources Law Center)). For a fuller version of this
article, see David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for
Management or Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 303
(1995) [hereinafter Farrier, Incentives].
71. See Farrier, Incentives, supra note 70, at 395-96.
72. See id. at 396.
73. See generally Fischel, supra note 33, at 4-7.
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was essentially an uncompensated regulatory solution to raising
an army;74 the fear expressed at the time was that if the gov-
ernment had to pay people fair compensation at market rates in
return for their service in the army, the cost would destroy the
army. 5 This fear is very similar to that expressed by environ-
mentalists today that we cannot afford to pay for resources for
environmental amenities; we must use uncompensated regula-
tion. The prophesies of doom about destroying the army by pay-
ing for labor, however, have not been borne out by experience.
We have a better army today by most assessments. 6
Of course, preserving the environment is different in many
ways from raising an army, but the experience does call into
question the glib assumption that an activity will inevitably be
destroyed if government has to pay market prices for resources.
Indeed, despite its vituperative rhetoric against takings legisla-
tion 7 7 the Clinton Administration has learned the political les-
son that strong environmental protection measures often are
made more acceptable politically if accomplished through pro-
grams that provide partial compensation-for example, through
"swaps" of other federal lands-to those who are asked to take
actions for the good of the public as a whole. 8
This realization is part of a more general movement in envi-
ronmental law in which we are (re)discovering that in some cir-
cumstances, positive incentives can change social behavior more
effectively than can negative ones. 9
74. See id. at 4-5.
75. Cf id. at 4-6 (discussing high costs of market-priced army members).
76. See id. at 6-7.
77. According to the Clinton Administration, the property rights bills seek to "re-
place the constitutional standards of fairness and justice with a rigid, one-size-fits-all
approach that focuses on the extent to which regulations affect property value." H.
Jane Lehman, Property Rights Fight Heats Up on Hill; Environmental Concerns,
Reimbursement Costs at Center of Debates, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1995, at F1 (quot-
ing Associate Attorney General John R. Schmidt).
78. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Swaps Broaden Federal Efforts To Shield Land,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at Al (describing the success of a program to "swap"
federal lands for environmentally sensitive parcels).
79. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Con-
trol Program That Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1840 (1994) (reviewing the report by
the Quality Environmental Management Subcommittee of the President's Commission
On Environmental Quality entitled Total Quality Management: A Framework for Pol-
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C.
The second lesson that I propose from my EPA experience
relates to the nature of takings law as a system of incentives for
regulating government behavior. The EPA RAs altered their be-
havior in response to takings law only to the extent that they
were able to divine a comprehensible "signal" in the takings case
law. ° The developing case law offers some messages,"' but
codifying clearer tests through legislation would improve greatly
the ability of the takings law system to send a clear signal to
regulators as to appropriate behavior.
One of the major breakthroughs in modern legal scholarship
was the recognition that a series of compensation verdicts can
constitute a regulatory system. 2 It does not follow, however,
that all systems of incentives are equally effective in conveying a
message to those that they regulate. Here I take issue with Pro-
fessor Krier's contribution to this Symposium. I agree that the
application of general principles to particular factual situations
is a primary source of uncertainty in regulatory takings law." I
do not, however, agree (if indeed Professor Krier intends to
make the claim) that all forms of legal rules have equal, and
therefore irreducible, levels of uncertainty. Some tests are clear-
er than others: The clearer the test, the easier it is to predict the
outcome accurately.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the existing negligence system
in tort law does not effectively regulate future conduct because it
does not give sufficiently precise and clear signals as to how to
alter behavior in order to minimize liability." In order to pro-
mote effective behavioral change, the legal system must provide
lution Prevention (1993)).
80. See supra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text.
81. See id.
82. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
83. See James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143
(1997).
84. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Defenses/Enforcing Standards: The Next
Stage of the Tort Revolution?, 43 RUTGERs L. REv. 1069, 1072 (1991) (arguing that
"present tort doctrines and institutions are not well-suited to provide the kinds of
information and predictability that are necessary if potential injurers are to change




something similar to what is called a "safe harbor" in tax law:
clear, simple, predictable ex ante rules. Such rules are more
likely to elicit a change in behavior than muddled standards
that depend upon weighing multiple facts and circumstances ex
post.' Rather than emulate the majestic vagueness of negli-
gence law, we should learn the lesson in takings law that a clear
incentive signal will alter behavior more successfully to achieve
specified policy goals than a muddled one.
To alter government behavior effectively without demoralizing
government regulation, takings compensation legislation should
provide relatively clear, bright-line tests for what types of gov-
ernment actions are and are not compensable. This can be done
best by separating takings compensation legislation from man-
datory constitutional standards that define a taking.
85. Cf id. at 1079-83 (discussing post hoc evaluation of facts in negligence law).
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